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Chinese patriliny and the cycles of yang and laiwang
Charles Stafford 
 
As James Watson observes, anthropologists have tended to view Chinese society 
through a ‘lineage paradigm’--in part mistakenly derived from the seminal work of 
Maurice Freedman, and thus, by extension, from the work of his Africanist 
colleagues--which assumes that in China ‘the ideology of patrilineal descent takes 
precedence over all other principles of social organization’ (J. Watson 1986:274).  
They have also often drawn, again following Freedman, a distinction between the 
study of Chinese ‘kinship’ (primarily meaning formal descent groups such as 
lineages) and the study of the Chinese ‘family’ (primarily meaning the informal 
business of everyday family life): 
We can show without much difficulty that kinship bound together large 
numbers of people in Chinese society and exerted an important effect on their 
political, economic, and religious conduct at large.  Family is another matter.  
Essentially, its realm is that of domestic life, a realm of co-residence and the 
constant involvement in affairs of the hearth, children and marriage.  Kinship 
is something different (Freedman 1979:240-1). 
In short, while the ‘lineage paradigm’ assumes that the ideals and realities of 
descent-based kinship are paramount in Chinese social organization, family life and 
the ‘affairs of the hearth’ have generally been, as a matter of definition, explicitly 
excluded from kinship, and thus from this central organizing role.   
 Whatever its analytical strengths and weaknesses--and Freedman’s 
contribution to the study of Chinese kinship is beyond question--this formalist 
approach is liable, I think, to obscure in anthropological accounts the lived 
experience of Chinese kinship, and to misconstrue the relationship of ‘affairs of the 
hearth’ both to formal kinship and to other kinds of relatedness in China.  I should 
stress that the term relatedness, as I use it in this paper, refers to literally any kind of 
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relation between persons--including those seemingly ‘given’ by biology and/or 
‘produced’ via social interactions--and is thus obviously intended to encompass 
formal and informal relations of kinship and much else besides.  The justification for 
using such a decidedly general term is the fact, illustrated in most of the 
contributions to this volume, that the boundaries between various categories of 
human social relations (including those defined as ‘formal kinship’, ‘informal kinship’, 
‘fictive kinship’, and ‘friendship’) are often very malleable indeed.  This is why it is 
useful to question these categories together, and in particular to examine the 
boundaries between them, under the encompassing category of relatedness. When 
this is done in the Chinese case, we discover, not surprisingly, a wide range of 
indigeneous or popular notions of relatedness, and two of these will be set out 
below. These are not the ones classically associated with China, and they therefore 
help challenge some of our preconceptualisations about Chinese kinship (e.g. about 
the status of women within it). 
 I would suggest that the ‘lineage paradigm’ of Chinese anthropology, when 
placed in comparative perspective, has helped sustain the impression that Chinese 
kinship is, in essence, an extreme and non-fluid version of patriliny: a male-
dominated system of rigidly defined agnatic groups, of kinship given by birth, of 
immutable connections, of exclusion, and of women who have power only as 
disruptive outsiders.  (This impression is the product of a particular definition of 
kinship, and what this definition excludes.)  The implicit and potentially misleading 
comparison is with seemingly less rigid, less exclusive systems of kinship: those 
portrayed as fluid, negotiable, incorporative and processual, and in which the roles of 
women are seen in a positive light.  Here I have in mind recent discussions of ‘fluid’ 
Austronesian kinship and identity (e.g. Carsten 1995aa, 1997; Astuti 1995; and the 
contributions to this volume by Astuti and Middleton).   The mutability of kin relations 
portrayed in these accounts--their creative production and transformation over time--
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seems almost directly at odds with the supposedly ‘given’ nature of Chinese 
patrilineal descent. 
 In this essay, however, I want to stress precisely the processual and creative 
aspects of Chinese kinship and relatedness.  I will suggest that alongside patriliny, 
which undoubtedly does carry a great force in China, and alongside affinity, which in 
recent years has received greater attention in sinological anthropology, we find two 
other equally forceful, and relatively incorporative systems of Chinese relatedness. In 
an attempt to remain close to informants’ models, I’ll tentatively gloss these as ‘the 
cycle of  yang’ (which centres mostly on parent-child relationships) and ‘the cycle of 
laiwang’ (which centres mostly on relationships between friends, neighbours and 
acquaintances).  In both cycles, the production of relatedness (often through rather 
everyday and/or domestic transactions) is clearly seen; and I will argue that in China 
‘rigid’ patrilineal descent is crucially articulated with these distinctly fluid, creative and 
incorporative systems. 
 The contributions by Lambert and Hutchinson to this volume, which draw on 
Rajasthani and Nuer material, similarly stress the articulation of patriliny with other 
bases of relatedness.  Lambert, for her part, discusses the significance of ‘fictive’ 
Rajasthani kinship--ties based on co-residence and commensality--within a strongly 
patrilineal and virilocal setting.  Hutchinson discusses ‘substances’ (money, guns, 
paper) which have become, in recent decades, increasingly salient in Nuer social 
life.  She argues that these have become new ‘media of relatedness’ for the Nuer--
thus transforming, and being transformed by, longstanding conceptions of ‘blood’ 
and kinship.  In all three cases--Nuer, Rajasthani and Chinese--patrilineal ties of 
blood and descent, however defined, must be seen in the context of other notions of 
relatedness, notions which themselves change in the flow of history.   
 In what follows, I will first describe a wedding in rural north China in order to 
illustrate what is meant by the cycles of yang and laiwang, and in order to show how 
they coexist and partly merge with patriliny and affinity.i  Then I will turn to the 
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literature on Chinese kinship in order to ask why the patrilineal image remains 
dominant in our understandings.  Finally, by way of conclusion, I will return to the 
more general question of Chinese relatedness in comparative perspective.  I should 
perhaps stress at the outset that the paradigmatic examples of Chinese patriliny 
have been drawn from the powerful lineages of South China, whereas my material 
comes from communities in northeastern China and southeastern Taiwan where 
lineages, as such, are not elaborated.  I would however suggest that these two 
cycles of relatedness are certainly found within even the most ‘exclusive’ Chinese 
descent groups, and that my argument is supported by existing ethnography from all 
regions of China. 
 
The wedding
The setting is the courtyard of a brick farmhouse at the end of a dirt path in Dragon-
head, a small farming village in northeastern China.  Here a crowd of local people 
(about fifty of them) have gathered to watch over and to participate in various 
preparations for a wedding which will take place tomorrow.  Noisily joking amongst 
themselves, women squat in a make-shift tent outside and prepare food for what 
they say will be a 40-table (i.e. about 300-guest) wedding-banquet.  The mother of 
the groom seems very agitated, and the father looks distinctly ill, as if he may shortly 
have a heart-attack.  A large pig has been slaughtered and its carcass dragged, on 
the back of a cart, into the middle of the courtyard.  Now an elderly man and his wife 
carve up big chunks of pork, and weigh and sell this meat to a circle of standers-by, 
mostly women.  Young men loiter around the edges, smoking cigarettes and talking, 
while children race in and out of the house and the courtyard.   
 In the midst of this preparatory activity, a friend suggests that I should be 
introduced to the groom.  I’m taken up to the house and led into the ‘new room’ 
(xinfang), i.e. the newly-prepared bridal chamber.  Here I’m left alone with a young 
man who sits in splendid isolation, smoking nervously, not allowed to help with the 
 59
preparations for his own wedding.  Through the window we observe the activity 
outside.  The room itself is in striking contrast with the rest of the austere farmhouse.  
The floor is newly painted a shiny red, and guests are expected to remove their 
shoes on entering.  The kang (i.e. the fire-heated brick platform-bed) on which he 
sits is surrounded with new lace curtains, and piled high with pink and red quilts.  
(I’m reminded of Emperor Pu Yi’s observation about his own wedding chamber: ‘it all 
looked like a melted red wax candle’.)  A ‘cute’ (ke’ai) poster of a baby boy and girl 
adorns the wall.  The room is equipped with a series of new appliances: an electric 
fan and a small washing machine from the bride’s family; and a colour television, 
stereo and VCR from the groom’s family. 
 The young man explains that his parents have spent about 20,000 renminbi, 
i.e. over #1600, on this event, including the preparation of the xinfang.  This amount-
-now an average sum for the ‘groom’s side’ (nanfang) to spend on a wedding--
represents (very roughly) from two to ten year’s income for a rural family.ii  Getting 
married in this way, he says, is of course a lot of trouble (mafan), but (as has often 
been explained to me) it is almost impossible to get by in rural China with a simple, 
inexpensive wedding.  This is partly because, for rural families with sons, wedding-
related expenses are unavoidable in a market which favours the ‘bride’s side’ 
(nufang).  In order to attract a bride, as one man put it, ‘even a poor groom’s side still 
has to spend a lot of money--and if they’re rich, they must spend even more!’  By 
contrast, these days ‘the ones raising daughters strike it rich’ (yang guniang de dou 
facai). 
 The groom tells me that he and his fiancee, a young woman from a village 
about 2 Ω hours away by bus, were ‘introduced’ (jieshao) by an intermediary, and 
now they know each other fairly well.  Tomorrow morning he will collect her from her 
parent’s home, and before leaving she will eat pork, literally ‘departing-mother-meat’ 
(liniangrou), ‘so that she will not miss her mother’ (weile ta buhui xiang mama). Then 
bride and groom will be transported, along with some 40 of her relatives, by taxi and 
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bus back to this very room.  Various wedding-day activities--including yakang 
(‘pressing the kang’ with a baby boy), and naofang (in which the bride and groom are 
roughly teased about sex while sitting on the kang)--will then highlight the hope that 
this outsider woman will quickly provide her husband’s family with a new descendant, 
and the hope that her first or second child will be a son.iii
 Although this is a wedding--and by definition a moment for celebrating affinity-
-the expense, the bother, and the symbolism of the event also seem fairly clear 
manifestations of an elaborated Chinese concern with patriliny and descent.  Of 
course, the new affinal link to the bride’s family is acknowledged and celebrated.  
The respected guests at the wedding banquet will be her parents and elder kinsmen, 
all of whom will eat in the place of honour (the kang-room of the groom’s parents), 
while the groom’s parents will themselves eat outside.  In the coming years, the 
newlyweds will continue to have important ties to the bride’s natal home.  But the 
centre-piece of the wedding is precisely her separation from this home, and her 
installation in her new family’s bridal chamber, the purpose of which--producing 
children to continue a patriline--is made very clear.  The woman is ‘marrying out’ 
(chujia), the residence is virilocal, her children will belong to her husband’s family 
and take his name, and she will respectfully serve (fengyang) her husband’s parents 
now and in their old age.  From the perspective of the groom’s parents the expense 
of the marriage, however inflated, is necessary: it is essential to attract a good 
daughter-in-law, because a daughter-in-law is a crucial element in their hoped-for 
future. 
 
Childhood and the cycle of yang
In any case, the emphasis in the wedding on descent and on affinity is made explicit. 
But there are at least two other systems of relatedness which impinge on this 
wedding, the first of which I have discussed elsewhere, and have glossed as ‘the 
cycle of yang’ (Stafford 1995:79-111).  Yang is a very common Chinese expression, 
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meaning ‘to raise’ or ‘to care for’, e.g. to ‘raise flowers’ (yang hua), to ‘raise pigs’ 
(yang zhu), or to ‘raise children’ (yang haizi).  In the case of children, the provision of 
yang--a kind of all-encompassing nurturance--is, of course, very complex.  It is also 
productive of an almost inescapable obligation: once they have grown up, children 
are heavily obliged to yang, ‘care for’, or fengyang, ‘respectfully care for’ their 
parents in old age.  More specifically, the receipt of yang from one’s parents during 
childhood obliges sons to return yang to their parents later in life.  But while old-age 
provision for parents is often discussed as if it were only a son’s business, most 
daughters effectively transfer their ‘debt of yang’ to their parents-in-law upon 
marriage, while in many cases still providing some care to their own mother and 
father.  Indeed, contrary to popular perceptions, the cycle may have as many 
implications for daughters as for sons, and it arguably has more practical 
implications for women than for men.  This is because it is women who normally 
shoulder (often ‘on behalf of’ their husbands) the actual process of providing yang: in 
many cases for their parents-in-law, their parents, their children and their 
grandchildren. 
 But what is the detail of this provision?  People often mention that parents 
provide their children with housing, clothing, education, money and food, but on 
examination none of these categories is very straightforward.  For example, in my 
account of Angang (in Taiwan) I described how the category of food could arguably 
include the popular remedies and traditional medicinal foods which parents provide 
for their children.  It could also include the expensive magical charms (fu)--slips of 
paper on which possessed spirit mediums write divine script--which children swallow 
for protection against evil spirits.  Through providing food, medicines, magical 
charms, etc., parents ‘protect and strengthen the bodies/persons’ (hushen, bushen) 
of their children (Stafford 1995:97-100).  And the expense and bother involved in 
providing this kind of ‘protection and strengthening’ to children--which goes on for 
many years--is not thought to be a waste because, as I have said, it is these very 
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children who will be relied upon in the future.  Their eventual ‘respectful nurturance’ 
(fengyang) of their parents may include the provision of material assistance--
primarily money, food and housing (cf. Hsieh 1985)--but also emotional support, e.g. 
affection. 
 The ‘cycle of yang’ is, then, a very involving system of mutual obligations 
between parents and children, which centrally entails the transfer of money and the 
sharing of food.  This cycle is also closely linked to the provision of care for 
ancestors, who similarly receive food and money from their (heavily obligated) 
descendants.  For this and other reasons, the idea of a ‘cycle of yang’ may appear to 
effectively overlap with the notion of patriliny, and with the Chinese emphasis on 
descent and on xiao, ‘filial obedience’.  But I would suggest that it does not entirely 
do so, for three reasons.  First, it is possible to produce, through yang, relatedness 
with children who are not one’s own ‘natural’ descendants.  Children raised by foster-
parents (called yang-mothers and yang-fathers) are obliged, because they have 
received yang from them, to care for their foster-parents in old age.  This might 
simply be seen as a way of imitating descent: adults without children ‘produce’ them 
through yang.  But I think it is wrong to assume that descent, as such, is the point, or 
to assume that yang cannot have a force--or a desirability--of its own (as I have tried 
to show).  Second, it is possible to have a ‘cycle of yang’ where descent, in the 
normal sense, is not a consideration.  For example, in Dragon-head I know a woman 
who, after the death of her mother, raised and cared for her younger brothers; they 
now provide her with yang in the form of money and food as if they had been her 
descendants.  But they are not her descendants, and she has her own husband and 
children.  Her brothers say that they support her because she raised them (yang), 
and many other examples suggest that yang may produce its own return (i.e. 
‘without descent’).  Third, there are many cases in which a failure in the ‘cycle of 
yang’ is what provokes the termination of relations of descent.  Sons who fail to 
provide their parents with yang may be dropped from family estates, ties of blood 
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notwithstanding.  In sum, yang may produce kinship where there is no ‘natural’ tie of 
descent, and the absence of yang may end kinship where a ‘natural’ descent tie 
exists. 
 Here I have only provided a cursory outline of this cycle, but there are two 
further observations I would like to make.  First, I would suggest that in informal 
Chinese kinship--i.e. the kind of kinship one observes in everyday life in a Chinese 
community--idioms related to the cycle of yang are as salient, and perhaps even 
more so, than idioms related to patrilineal descent, as such.  In other words, the lived 
experience of Chinese kinship is closely connected to the cycle of yang.  And this 
cycle--through its emphasis on feeding, nurturance and care--is comparable (as I 
have mentioned above) to the processual, fluid and transformative forms of kinship 
which anthropologists do not generally associate with China.  Second, I would 
suggest that if we paid as much attention to the cycle of yang as has been paid to 
patrilineal descent, our view of the role of women in Chinese kinship and society 
might be considerably transformed.  It may be true that from the perspective of 
formal kinship ideologies Chinese women are ‘dangerous’ and sometimes even 
‘polluting’ outsiders.  But women are at the centre of the most important processes in 
the cycle of yang, and it is through their everyday engagement with this cycle that 
they play, and are seen to play, a highly-valued role in Chinese kinship. 
 Now, what has this cycle to do with the wedding I have been describing?  
Forget, for a moment, the idea that the wedding shows how interested people are in 
honouring ties of affinity, or in generating descendants for a patriline.  Instead, note 
that a wedding is one of the key elements in the parent-child cycle of yang.  The last 
great, and often very expensive, obligation of Chinese parents to their children--
having provided them with food, clothing, housing, education, etc., throughout 
childhood--is to arrange for them to be properly married off.  Until this has happened, 
the work of parents is not done.  As much as the son, sitting in the ‘new room’, is 
obliged to marry for the sake of his parents, his parents, rushing about making final 
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arrangements, are obliged to provide him with a wedding.  They do this knowing that 
their son, along with his wife and their children, will eventually provide them with 
support and care (yang).  The bride, coming into this new family, effectively transfers 
her obligations to her parents-in-law: they are the ones she will live with and yang.  
And the marriage itself partly compensates her own parents for the expense and 
trouble of having raised her, while an in-coming daughter-in-law (assuming that they 
have a son) will hopefully provide them with the yang they are due in old age. 
 Notice however, and this is an important point, that the bride and groom are 
also involved in providing themselves with a wedding.  Once young people (both 
sons and daughters) are old enough to work and earn money, they usually hand 
over most of their income to their parents. But this is not yet ‘support for parents’.  A 
good proportion of this money is usually spent to cover future wedding expenses, 
including the preparation of the ‘new room’ (in the case of the groom), or the 
provision of a dowry for the bride (cf. Chen 1985).  The fact that children in this way 
effectively subsidize their own weddings may seem to diminish what I have been 
saying, that the wedding manifests a parental obligation which is part of the cycle of 
yang.  But in fact this flowing back and forth of support (my assistance makes it 
easier for you to assist me) is at the very core of Chinese notions of parent-child 
reciprocity. 
 
Neighbours and the cycle of laiwang
A somewhat similar notion of mutual support is at the core of the other cycle I have 
mentioned, the cycle of laiwang.  In certain ways--not least because it involves many 
similar processes and idioms, especially transfers of money and food--this cycle 
could be characterised as the extension of yang to the outside world.  In the 
anthropological literature on China it has most often been discussed in relation to the 
question of social ‘connections’ or guanxi (see especially Yang 1994 and Yan 1996).  
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I will briefly illustrate this cycle by again returning to the wedding in Dragon-head 
village, and by presenting a different, and rather cynical, view of the proceedings. 
 On the night before the wedding I visit the home of an elderly friend, Mr. 
Zhang, who really cannot understand why I should be so interested in attending 
tomorrow’s celebration and banquet.  He warns that they will expect money from me, 
and is very concerned that I’ll try to give more than necessary.  When attending 
wedding banquets, he notes, most neighbours (assuming they are farmers of 
average income) normally give 20 renminbi (#2.50), and Mr Zhang repeatedly 
stresses that I should not give more than this amount.   (His own annual income is 
only about 2000rmb.)  Relatives and friends often give 50 to 100rmb for wedding 
banquets, and the well-to-do are expected to give even more.  Mr Zhang notes that 
he does not himself intend to go, because of the expense and also because the 
kinship connection is ‘distant’ (yuan): the groom’s family are merely the relatives of 
his wife’s sister-in-law.  Beyond this, he disapproves of the practice (much expanded 
in recent years) of having very elaborate banquets for weddings and other 
occasions.  According to him, cadres with ‘advanced thinking’ (sixiang jinbu) set a 
good example by not being wasteful in this way.  He points out that in the case of 
this wedding the groom’s family are quite poor, and they have gone heavily into debt 
in order to have a celebration which will ‘look good for the guests’ (dui keren 
haokan).  They have borrowed 14,000 renminbi, a sum he says they will never 
manage to repay. 
 Late the next morning I go to the house where the wedding is to take place.  
The groom has long since departed to collect his bride, and it is raining on and off--a 
potential disaster given that they are hoping to feed some 300 people outside.  Most 
of the activity centres on food-preparation (inside the house and under a small tent).  
But a small crowd has also gathered on the porch where the village head (cunzhang) 
and an assistant are collecting money.  Arriving guests hand over cash, and their 
names and the amount given are written in a book; in return they receive six pieces 
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of candy wrapped in auspicious red paper.  Some women point out to me that this is 
a good thing: you give money, it is registered, and then if you later have some 
‘matter’ or ‘business’ (shi) of your own, this family will come and help you (cf. Potter 
& Potter 1990:210, Pasternak 1972:64). 
 Then I am spotted by my friend Mr Zhang, who after all has decided to attend.  
He immediately drags me off to the furthest corner of the courtyard where he and a 
group of laotou (old men, literally ‘old heads’) have staked claim to the place of least 
honour.  Around a wooden table set close to the ground, we squat on bricks which 
are sinking in the mud.  We fiddle with bowls and chopsticks, chatting about the 
weather and the wedding, and impatiently wait for the food to be served. Meanwhile 
the number of tables around us and in the neighbouring courtyard has expanded to 
50.  Because nothing can happen, and no one can eat, until the bride arrives, there 
is much discussion of the bad arrangements which have been made for her 
transportation (she might, after all, have been lodged close by last night).  After a 
while this conversation focuses on the possibility that she might not arrive at all, in 
which case, as everyone agreed, we would certainly still need to eat.  One old man 
knew of just such a case in which the bride-bringing bus had broken down, and the 
guests at that wedding had definitely eaten. 
 Then, belatedely, the bride and groom and her family arrive in cars and 
minibuses which make their way slowly through the muddy village lanes.  The guests 
step out, and the bride and groom approach the house, making their way through a 
volley of firecrackers.  In front of the assembled hungry crowd, they bow to their 
elders, and then to each other, before walking into the house. As far as the guests 
outside are concerned, that is the end of the ritual, and now the food should be 
served.  But there is further delay, and people keep coming out from the house and 
looking anxiously up the village lanes.  A rumour goes around that the bride’s mother 
has not yet arrived, and one of the old men at my table says to forget the mother, the 
banquet should begin (kaixi).  But it is not the mother who is missing, and after a few 
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more moments the banquet does begin--sixteen dishes are served, and we get down 
to the serious business of eating and drinking.  I am told that the meal probably cost 
about 3000 rmb--for Mr Zhang 1 Ω year’s income--but that this expense is more or 
less offset by the cash gifts collected in the morning.  The consensus is that the food 
is only very average (yibande).  At the weddings of rich people, I am told, the food 
does not include vegetables (cai) and is instead all meat dishes (rou): chicken, pork, 
beef and very big fish. 
 From Mr Zhang’s perspective, it may seem that this particular wedding is a 
waste of time, an unwelcome economic burden.  He is indifferent to the fate of the 
groom’s patriline, and to its affinal network.  As I noted, he measures this kinship 
connection as a distant one.  Furthermore, much of the ceremonial associated with 
weddings is private (i.e. not displayed to the crowd), so in effect Mr Zhang is only 
there for the meal, which he concludes is nothing special.  So what, in the end, is the 
reason for going?  Later he reiterates that contributing to these ceremonies of 
various kinds is expensive and burdensome, especially in communities such as 
Dragon-head where everyone is an acquaintance, friend or relative.  But he also 
quickly stresses that ‘attending ceremonials’ (ganli) is important because it is part of 
laiwang, literally ‘come and go’.  The expression laiwang describes the reciprocal 
movement, back and forth, between people who have a relationship of mutual 
assistance.  (Thus the expression wo gen ta you laiwang: ‘I have laiwang with him’, 
meaning ‘to have relations’.)  As Mr Zhang puts it, ‘when you have some business, 
I’ll come to you, when I have some business, you’ll come to me’ (ni you shi wo lai, 
wo you shi ni lai).  In our discussion, Mr Zhang also refers to the Chinese idiom li 
shang wang lai--‘courtesy demands reciprocity’, which could be translated as 
‘ceremonial generates back-and-forth’, i.e. laiwang.  The point is that the cycle of 
laiwang, which often consists of seemingly minor or ‘ceremonial’ transactions, is a 
crucial element in the building-up of relatedness between those who are not related 
(or not closely related) by kinship. 
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 The example Mr Zhang spontaneously gives is this.  He had recently been 
forced to build a new home--for him an almost unimaginably expense undertaking--
because his old one was literally collapsing.  At that time, many relatives, friends and 
neighbours had offered assistance (both in the form of gifts and loans).  The father of 
the groom at today’s wedding had given Mr Zhang some help, albeit small, and it 
was only right that Mr Zhang should therefore ‘attend the ceremonial’ (ganli) for the 
man’s son, thus helping to pay for a banquet which would ‘look good’ for the affines: 
‘courtesy demands reciprocity’.  For the bride and groom, and for their families, the 
wedding banquet is important not least because it manifests a community of support.  
As with the cycle of yang, the cycle of laiwang is built up through small actions and 
interactions, and it often similarly involves commensality, transfers of money, and the 
sharing of responsibilities.  And although laiwang, like yang, is sometimes conceived 
of as a transaction between men, this view is once again very misleading; the actual 
burden of producing everyday laiwang--and even that of special occasions--is often 
undertaken by women.  
 
The source of the lineage paradigm
In sum, the cycles of yang and laiwang--these two idioms of relatedness--carry a 
great force in China, and any Chinese ‘family history’ inevitably includes them, as 
surely as it includes a history of descent and inter-marriage. They stand alongside 
patriliny and affinity, but are not reducible to them.  However, as I said at the outset, 
Chinese kinship seems almost inevitably to stand, within anthropology, for a strong 
version of patriliny.  One reason for this is undoubtedly the influence, within 
sinological anthropology, of a Freedman-inspired lineage paradigm. (Freedman’s 
ongoing influence is highlighted in a volume on ‘the Chinese family’ published in 
1985 in which, as Arthur Wolf notes, fully 13 of  the 15 articles address Freedman 
directly [A. Wolf 1985:3-4].)  Freedman’s work, in turn, must be seen in the context of 
the central themes of British social anthropology, and the development in the 1940s 
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and 1950s of an Africanist ‘lineage theory’ which stressed the overriding significance 
of lineage and descent in certain kinds of societies, and especially in non-state 
‘homogeneous’ societies (Kuper 1988:190-209). 
 Freedman was clearly influenced by this literature and addressed it directly in 
his own work  (e.g. 1958:126-40), while always trying to stress the unique 
characteristics of Chinese society and history.  (For example, by rather drily pointing 
out that ‘however we define the category “homogeneous societies” we can scarcely 
say that China falls within its scope’ [1958:136].)   Indeed, Watson notes that 
Freedman himself had serious misgivings about an overly lineage-oriented view of 
China, and also notes that the lineage paradigm has been subject, over the years, to 
many critical studies.  But he suggests that even these critiques (focusing, e.g., on 
affinity, ethnicity, class, and gender) have tended to be structured around the lineage 
paradigm (J. Watson 1982, 1986:274-5). Thus, as recently as 1995, David Faure 
and Helen Siu were again commenting--in a work which relates south China lineages 
to land and ethnicity--that ‘Maurice Freedman’s seminal works on Chinese kinship 
and descent are so influential that many scholars have long taken for granted the 
lineage paradigm for understanding Chinese social life’ (Faure & Siu 1995:210). 
 But this comment seems to me slightly misleading.  What is striking is not that 
scholars have taken for granted the lineage paradigm (and I would guess that most 
of them have not done so), but rather that in spite of their best critical efforts, 
including those of Freedman, we often still sum up Chinese kinship and social life 
with reference to patrilineal descent.  The impression still lingers that patrilineal 
descent (i.e. the ‘essence’ of Chinese kinship) does take ‘precedence over all other 
principles of social organization’ in China.  Why should this be the case?  I propose 
four interlinked explanations within the history of the anthropology of China: the use 
of a formalist definition of kinship (which excludes ‘family life’ and informality); an 
emphasis on regional analysis (which tends to emphasize the role of formal descent 
groups, and the ‘public’ roles of men, while overlooking the significance of local 
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processes of kinship and relatedness, and the ‘private’ roles of women); an 
emphasis on historical sources (which often take a male-dominated view of kinship, 
and therefore tend to reinforce the ‘lineage paradigm’ view of China); and an under-
emphasis on participant-observation fieldwork.  That is, the emphasis on regional 
and historical analysis has tended to devalue, within sinological anthropology, the 
role of village-based participant-observation fieldwork, and this has perhaps been 
further compounded by the practical difficulties of conducting village-based research 
in the PRC.  One result is that Chinese ethnography is sometimes difficult to 
compare with ethnography from settings where ‘intimate’ fieldwork is more common.  
I would suggest we have partly missed the ‘fluid’ nature of Chinese kinship because 
we have not always done the kind of fieldwork in which the production of relatedness 
is there to be seen. 
 Perhaps a more prosaic reason for the ongoing influence of the lineage 
paradigm is simply that much of the best work in sinological anthropology has 
focused on descent groups, often based on ethnography in south China where such 
groups were very strong.  This material (which after all originates in the concerns of 
Chinese informants) is sometimes very striking.  For example, James Watson notes 
(in a review article which stresses precisely that Chinese kinship is not all about 
descent) that a Chinese lineage can be ‘a remarkably closed corporation’ in which 
absorbing outsiders is a messy business (1982:598-9).  He points out that ‘one of the 
commonest forms of slander among the Cantonese is to assert publicly that one’s 
rivals have sunk to such depths that they have had to recruit outsiders’ (1982:599).iv  
A similar principle is arguably shown again in the images, equally striking, of the 
incorporation of ‘dangerous outsider women’ into the patrilineal system.  As Watson 
observes, ‘viewed strictly in formal terms, Chinese women stand outside the male-
dominated kinship system altogether’ (J. Watson 1982:615).  Based on research in 
Taiwan, Emily Martin Ahern (1975) suggests this may help to explain, at least in part, 
Chinese religious ideologies of women’s spiritual pollution.  For example, in giving 
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birth (something obviously necessary to the continuation of patrilines) women are 
contaminated with their own pollutedness and this follows them to their graves.  
Ahern suggests it is partly the ambiguous status of women--as outsiders who 
produce insiders--which makes them simultaneously powerful and polluting (Ahern 
1975, cf. Seaman 1981).  Rubie Watson notes that in Ha Tsuen (New Territories), a 
community where ‘patrilineal values dominate social life’, married-in women are 
‘suspect’ (R. Watson 1986:620).  This is partly reflected in naming practices which 
implicitly devalue (or, more accurately, ignore) their status.  While men during the 
life-course acquire various names which mark important social transitions and roles, 
and which are often linked to the classical scholarly tradition, women progressively 
become nameless.  In the end they are simply called ‘old woman’, and this implies 
that they ‘do not, indeed cannot, attain full personhood’ (1986:619).  Selective 
readings of these kinds might (however wrongly) give the impression of a kinship 
system in which outsiders are almost impossible to absorb, and in which women 
(defined as outsiders) are polluters and non-persons.  More generally, the image has 
perhaps been given of a society dominated by kinshipv and dominated specifically by 
the ideology of patrilineal descent. 
 
Towards a new paradigm of Chinese relatedness
But consider some of the work which might be said to show otherwise.  
Anthropologists have increasingly shown the importance attached in China to 
relationships which are not based on kinship.  Some recent examples include 
DeGlopper’s work on ‘voluntary association’ among the residents of Lukang in 
Taiwan (1995), the discussions by Mayfair Yang and Yan Yunxiang of personal 
guanxi networks in post-Mao mainland China (1994), and my own work on the 
relationship between teachers and pupils in Taiwan (Stafford 1995:56-68).  Without 
question, in many Chinese contexts ties based on mutual assistance, co-residence, 
friendship, and discipleship may be more significant than ties of kinship. 
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 Historians and anthropologists have also shown that Chinese patriliny only 
ever operates within a wider politico-economic context (see e.g. Gates 1996).   That 
is, they have problematised the notion of pan-Chinese, timeless principles of kinship, 
and shown that descent, as such, never ‘stands alone’.  The volume edited by Siu & 
Faure (1995) addresses, among other things, the mutual impact of ethnicity, state-
building and lineage development in a single Chinese region, suggesting that the 
political-economy of land control, and considerations of ethnic differentiation, may be 
as significant in lineage development as considerations of kinship in the narrow 
sense.  Rubie Watson (1985) examines the interrelation of patrilineal ideology and 
class, and shows how patriliny may underpin class exploitation within lineages.  The 
volume edited by Davis & Harrell (1993) analyses the (often paradoxical) impact of 
state intervention and official ideology on kinship practice in post-Mao China.  In 
short, in terms of Chinese history, and even within the history of Chinese kinship, 
ethnicity, class and state intervention must be viewed as equal players with 
‘patriliny’. 
 Anthropologists have of course also stressed the significance, within Chinese 
kinship, of marriage and of affinal links (e.g. Pasternak 1972:60-94, R. Watson 
1985:117-136, Goody 1990:21-51, Watson & Ebrey 1991).  James Watson observes 
that for most Chinese people, agnates have probably been ‘no more significant than 
affines, matrilateral kin, and neighbours’ (1982:606).  Freedman himself stressed, for 
instance, the significant and ongoing involvement of ‘married-out’ sisters and 
daughters with their natal families (1979:295), while Bernard and Rita Gallin have 
argued that matrilateral and affinal ties are often characterised by informants in 
positive (and utilitarian) terms, and should therefore not be analysed as if they were 
simply negative (Gallin & Gallin 1985).  This work on marriage and affinity coincides 
with a reexamination of Chinese gender relations, which has also transformed the 
anthropological view of Chinese patriliny and kinship.  Not surprisingly, ideologies of 
female subordination are often contradicted by fieldwork observations, and several 
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writers have tried to address the ensuing paradoxes (e.g. M. Wolf 1974, Ahern 1975, 
Martin 1988). 
 From this perspective came the model which, in my view, came closest to 
genuinely challenging the dominance of the lineage paradigm, Margery Wolf’s notion 
of the ‘uterine family’ (M. Wolf 1972).  It is interesting that Wolf’s original fieldwork 
focused precisely on informal kinship and on an intimate understanding of everyday 
life within several rural Taiwanese households (i.e. it was initially based on intensive 
participant-observation in one community).  She came to the conclusion that, from a 
woman’s perspective, work on behalf of a uterine family (comprised of a woman and 
her children) was more important than work on behalf of her husband’s patriline.  
Through developing strong emotional ties with sons in particular, a woman could 
solidify her current position and protect her future security. So the uterine family 
stood both inside and alongside the male-dominated patrilineal family, potentially as 
a powerful competitor for loyalties. 
 The processes Wolf describes (e.g. those relating to child development) are 
very much part of what I have described as the cycle of yang, but the uterine family 
model clearly has some weaknesses.  One is that it characterises the position of 
Chinese women in largely negative terms: women, as marrying-in outsiders, had to 
develop ties because otherwise they were without power.  The power they 
developed was a threat to the unity of  patrilines--and seen to be so.vi These views 
undoubtedly come from the statements of informants, and from situations Wolf 
observed during fieldwork, but I think they under-represent the positive evaluations 
of women, and are thus potentially misleading.  Another weakness of the uterine 
family model is that it implies a distinctive ‘female consciousness’ and distinctive 
‘women’s strategies’, useful notions which may, nevertheless, be problematic in the 
Chinese context, as elsewhere (cf. the discussion by Martin 1988). 
 In any case, Wolf has tended to withdraw the ‘uterine family’ model from 
serious consideration, in part perhaps because she accepts Freedman’s formal 
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definition of kinship which excludes informal family life, and thus excludes the 
processes she herself has described (M. Wolf 1985:204).  She suggests that 
‘...China was--and still is--a patriarchy’, and has suggested that the uterine family 
was only ever a coping strategy: 
Women, in their struggle for some security in their day-to-day existence with 
the all-powerful male-oriented family and it larger organization, the lineage, 
worked like termites hollowing out from within places for themselves and their 
descendants ... Uterine families were in fact only a way of accommodating to 
the patriarchal family (M. Wolf 1985:11). 
Furthermore, she suggests that in mainland China the uterine family has now 
disappeared (‘...because the need for it has disappeared’)vii, although reciprocal 
parent-child obligations have not (1985:207-8). 
 I am certain, however, that Margery Wolf had (and has) something right.  
What she is pointing out is the profound significance in China of relatedness 
constituted through the small interactions of daily life (e.g. between mothers and 
children), and the significance of this kind of relatedness for our understanding of 
formal Chinese kinship.  In this paper I have proposed the cycle of yang as a more 
inclusive and positive way of viewing this processual relatedness, one in which the 
idiom of yang is raised to the significance of ‘descent’.  I have also suggested that 
another, somewhat overlapping process, the cycle of laiwang, is equally important, 
and helps us to understand Chinese ties which are not based on kinship.  These two 
cycles, in combination, help to place Chinese patriliny and affinity in perspective.  
They (the cycles) are also already documented in the ethnography of Chinaviii--our 
difficulty is in grasping what this ethnography has been trying to tell us. 
 
Conclusion
In comparative perspective, as I said at the outset, Chinese kinship has often been 
assumed to be of the rigid and non-incorporative kind.  I have suggested that such a 
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view is, however, partly the product of a particular definition of kinship, and of 
particular ways of doing anthropological research.  Not surprisingly, the reality is that 
in China, as elsewhere, people make kinship--it is, of course, never simply ‘given’ to 
them by birth--and patrilineal ideologies, however powerful, are forced to compete in 
a crowded field of ideas about the ways in which relatedness is produced.  This is 
not to say that people in China ignore or devalue what are seen to be ‘natural’ 
connections between kin.  It is rather to stress the social malleability of such 
connections: the ways in which they are both reinforced and cut (e.g. due to 
successes or failures in the cycle of yang), and also extended (e.g. through adoption, 
or the extension of yang-like reciprocity to the outside world).   
 By comparison with the ‘lineage paradigm’, the cycles of yang and laiwang 
are rather homely folk-models of Chinese relatedness, and ones in which kinship 
and friendship are seen to be hard work, the product of everyday human 
interactions.  But this perspective has at least three advantages.  First, it allows us to 
see Chinese relatedness as a continuum--comprising everything from the most 
formal relations of descent, to the least formal relations of, say, secret friendship--
and to see how certain idioms of reciprocity effectively link the elements in this 
continuum.  Second, it helps us unravel the complex roles of Chinese women in a 
system of relatedness which often seems, at least formally, to devalue their 
contributions.  Finally, it has the virtue of making Chinese kinship--or more precisely 
Chinese relatedness--seem less strange, less distant from the kind of ‘fluid’ or 
processual relatedness anthropologists encounter elsewhere, e.g. among the Vezo 
of Madagascar, or in Malaysian fishing villages.  Of course, Chinese patriliny has 
been, and remains, a remarkable socio-cultural institution.  And when seen against 
the background of the two cycles discussed in this paper, it is, in my view, more 
rather than less remarkable. 
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also deeply indebted to the people of Angang (in Taiwan) and Dragon-head (in 
northeastern China) for many kindnesses shown.  Michael Lambek, Janet Carsten, 
and many other colleagues (including participants in the Edinburgh conference) have 
provided useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and I am grateful for their 
help. 
ii. 
Household incomes now vary quite dramatically in this community.  Well-to-do 
families make as much as 10,000rmb per year (some even more); average families 
(and workers in the city) make about half that amount, while others make do with 
2000rmb or less per year.  School-teachers make about 2400rmb per year. 
iii. 
Under birth control regulations, a rural woman who first gives birth to a daughter is 
then allowed a second child (i.e. given another opportunity to have a son), but if her 
first child is a boy she must stop.  Ideally, most couples would prefer to have two 
children, i.e. ‘one of each’, and so are quite happy to have a daughter first.  But 
ending up with two daughters is considered, by most people, to be a misfortune. 
iv. 
In another article he discusses in detail the adoption rules for one lineage: ‘any 
adopting father who attempts to bring an outsider into the village must submit to an 
initiation ceremony [nominally for the son] during which he is humiliated by his 
peers’.  This involves an expensive banquet for village elders and leaders, who, 
unusually, do not bring gifts of cash to the event.  Instead they eat and drink, and 
then insist on borrowing money from the host, all the while shouting insults at him for 
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failing to produce a son.  Finally he pays them to sign a banner which confirms his 
son’s position in the lineage (J. Watson 1975:293-306).  The point of Watson’s article 
is that many people actually prefer to go through this ritual humiliation rather than 
adopt an ‘insider’ son (who may be more difficult to control if segmentary rivalries get 
out of control). 
v. 
So it is perhaps surprising to read the following comments by anthropologists of 
China.  Maurice Freedman: ‘The Western literature... is full of variations on the 
theme that the family was the basic unit of Chinese society... But this is not 
significantly truer of China than of most other societies...’ (1979:240).  Donald 
DeGlopper: ‘To be sure, most people belonged to families and family membership 
was a very significant aspect of every person’s identity, but I fail to see what is so 
distinctively Chinese about this’ (1995:24).  Fei Xiaotong: ‘I do not think that [in 
China] kinship possesses any force of extension by itself and is valued as such’ 
(1946:6). 
vi. 
In another article, Wolf discusses the power of women’s gossip--again a negative 
formulation of women’s power (M. Wolf 1974, cf. Ahern 1975:199-200). 
vii. 
In this she is contradicted by Hill Gates, who suggests that women in mainland 
China ‘still marry principally to establish uterine families’ (1996:202).  To my mind 
this is an extremely odd characterisation of why Chinese women marry.  I would 
suggest that they generally  must marry in order not to be left out of the cycle of 
yang. 
viii. 
On the cycle of yang (to cite only a few examples) see discussions of the ongoing 
relationship of yang between the living and dead (J. Watson 1988, Thompson 1988), 
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and discussions of ‘meal-rotation’ as a way of providing yang to one’s parents (Hsieh 
1985).  Also see Cohen on the process for sons of becoming (as opposed to being 
born as) coparceners in estates (1976:70-85), and Chen on the contributions of 
daughters to their own dowries (1985).  On the cycle of laiwang, see, e.g.,  
Pasternak’s discussion of the ongoing system of reciprocal obligations between non-
agnates (Pasternak 1972:64; cf.Yang 1994, Yang 1996, and Potter & Potter 
1990:210). 
